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Following the 2016 Referendum on UK membership of the EU, the British 
government indicated that providing evidence of consistent, regular working 
histories would form the basis of applications by EU migrants seeking to remain in 
the country long-term. (Home Office, 2018, 2020). In doing so, it made evidence of 
legal, paid employment central to obtaining legitimate status in the country, but 
those struggling to produce such information face potentially precarious futures (e.g. 
Sumption & Kone, 2018). The vulnerability of migrants of Roma heritage to 
insecure, low status, (and sometimes exploitative), employment conditions in the 
UK has been highlighted by various studies (e.g. Poole & Adamson 2008; Brown et 
al., 2016). Such patterns of employment have frequently been described as 
‘precarious labour’ in other parts of the European Union (e.g. Apostolova et al., 
2014; Vincze, 2015). Studies have suggested that, given the specific disadvantages 
faced by Roma migrants in the UK, the aftermath of ‘Brexit’ posed enhanced risks 
an intensification of the precarity they already experience (e.g. Brown et al., 2018). 
Drawing on interviews conducted with EU migrants of Roma heritage in two 
different locations in 2019, this paper assesses the implications of Brexit for their 
continued residence. It argues that for Roma in the UK, Brexit represents a 
contemporary, but expanded example of precarity, encompassing not only work, but 
also family and future, hopes and aspirations. 
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Tras el referéndum de 2016 sobre la pertenencia del Reino Unido a la UE, el gobierno 
británico indicó que proporcionar pruebas de antecedentes laborales constantes y regulares 
constituiría la base de las solicitudes de los inmigrantes de la UE que buscan permanecer en el 
país a largo plazo. (Ministerio del Interior, 2018, 2020). Al hacerlo, hizo que la evidencia del 
empleo legal y remunerado fuera fundamental para obtener un estatus legítimo en el país, 
pero aquellos que luchan por producir dicha información enfrentan un futuro potencialmente 
precario (Observatorio de Migración, 2018). La vulnerabilidad de los migrantes de origen 
romaní a las condiciones de empleo inseguras, de bajo estatus (y en ocasiones de explotación) 
en el Reino Unido ha sido destacada por varios estudios (por ejemplo, Poole & Adamson 
2008; Brown et al., 2016). Estos patrones de empleo se han descrito con frecuencia como 
"trabajo precario" en otras partes de la Unión Europea (por ejemplo, Apostolova et al., 2014; 
Vincze, 2015). Los estudios han sugerido que, dadas las desventajas específicas que enfrentan 
los inmigrantes romaníes en el Reino Unido, las secuelas del 'Brexit' plantearon mayores 
riesgos y una intensificación de la precariedad que ya experimentan (Brown et al., 2018). 
Basándose en entrevistas realizadas con inmigrantes de la UE de ascendencia romaní en dos 
lugares diferentes en 2019, este documento evalúa las implicaciones del Brexit para su 
residencia continua. Sostiene que, para los romaníes en el Reino Unido, el Brexit representa 
un ejemplo contemporáneo, pero ampliado, de precariedad, que abarca no solo el trabajo, sino 
también la familia y el futuro, las esperanzas y aspiraciones. 
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he scope and application of the concept of precarity in the social 
sciences has grown rapidly in recent decades.  While the multi-
faceted nature of the topic has been explored across various 
disciplines, work remains the original, and predominant frame of reference, 
with the increased breadth and depth of precarious employment - in the 
Global North, at least - often regarded as an intrinsic feature of neo-liberal 
economic models (e.g. Castles, 2011). An important part of this has focused 
on the role of migration in creating and maintaining precarious work and 
precarious workers (e.g. Anderson, 2010). In the words of Schierup & Bak 
Jørgensen, “A growing body of research has pointed to migration as an 
important element in this broader process of the erosion of social and labour 
rights propelling a sweeping ‘recommodification’ of the labour force (2016, 
p. 3). 
One perspective has sought to analyse the relationship and congruencies 
“between precarious labor (sic) and precarious life” (Millar, 2017, p. 5); that 
is, how particular forms of work and structural employment conditions 
create ‘ways of being’. Those ‘ways of being’ are seen as so intrinsic to the 
employment experiences of the migrant, that the expansion of precarious 
labour, (e.g. temporary / zero-hour contracts, agency work, forced labour, 
informality, etc.), into the general workforce has been termed a process of 
the latter ‘becoming migrant’ (Schierup & Bak Jørgensen, 2016). 
While many EU migrants in the UK are vulnerable to precarious work, 
(e.g. Lewis et al., 2015), existing research suggests migrants of Roma 
heritage are disproportionately at risk. This is partly the product of racial 
discrimination and exclusion in countries of origin, (e.g. ERRC, 2007), but it 
also connected to the structures of migration themselves (e.g. FRA, 2009). 
Kozce described the crucial intersecting effects of “processes of migration, 
racialization and neoliberalism” (2018, p. 459), in producing the 
marginalisation of Roma migrants within the EU. Many researchers have 
identified precarity as an essential feature of Roma life (see below). 
In this paper, I examine the impact of Brexit on the precarity of migrants 
of Roma heritage. While the features of the precarious labour that Roma 
migrants in the UK engage in may have been reported, (e.g. Brown et al. 
2016; Tileaga et al., 2019a, 2019b), only limited assessment of the role of 
‘Brexit’ in expanding this precarity has been undertaken (e.g. Migration 
Yorkshire, 2017; Nagy, 2018). Demonstrating evidence of regular, 
T 
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documented and consistent working histories is at the heart of the process for 
those EU citizens wishing to remain. Assessing the implications of labour 
precarity among Roma is crucial to understanding how Brexit renders their 
future position. In doing so, it adds to the growing literature on migrant 
precarity after Brexit (e.g. Botterill et al., 2019; Duda-Mikulin, 2019).  
However, I also argue that the factual detail of work histories is 
insufficient to understand the true extent of what precarity looks like for 
migrants of Roma heritage in this period. To address this, I draw on Miller’s 
idea of the symbiotic link between precarious labour and precarious life, to 
analyse their experiences in the period since the Referendum. By describing 
how they “respond to this condition and what they make of life in the 
present—and whether and how they imagine it otherwise” (Allison & Piot, 
2012, p. 5), we can open up further perspectives on how “precarious labour 
and precarious life intersect in particular times and places.” (Millar, 2017, 
p.5) These dynamics are essential to comprehending aspects of migration, 
work and contemporary society in the UK, and without them, our 
understanding of precarity remains circumscribed. 
The article commences with a brief review of the relevant literature on 
CEE migration and the UK labour market and references to precarity, 
followed by specific focus on migrants of Roma heritage within the UK, and 
the situation pre and post Brexit. 
 
CEE Migrants and the UK Labour market 
 
The expansion of the European Union in 2004 and 2007 enabled large 
numbers of Central and Eastern European (CEE) citizens to enter the UK as 
working migrants under freedom of movement regulations (Directive 
2004/38/EC). In 2014, the Migration Advisory Committee calculated that a 
million EU migrants had taken up low-skilled jobs in the UK since 2004, 
half of which were from Central and Eastern Europe (MAC, 2014). 
While they can be found in many different occupations, a significant 
percentage has filled roles at the lower end of the labour market (e.g. 
Anderson, et al., 2006). This was supported by analysis, which found that 
migrants from A8/A2 accession countries “were overrepresented in low-
skilled occupations, such as entry-level services or trades positions”, of 
which factory and construction jobs formed a significant proportion 
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(Fernández-Reino & Rienzo, 2019, p. 8). CEE migrants recorded the lowest 
earnings and featured higher rates of non-permanent contracts (Clarke, 2017; 
Rolfe & Hudson-Sharp, 2016). In a general analysis of UK Quarterly Labour 
Force, Spreckelsen and Seeleib-Kaiser (2016), found that while young EU 
migrants, aged 20-34, from Central & Eastern Europe, (where most migrants 
of Roma heritage in the UK originate), had higher rates of employment, they 
worked much longer hours, in lower quality positions, and were far less 
likely to have a permanent contract than their UK peers. Significantly, they 
highlighted a clear stratification of labour market position based on the 
conditions in employees’ country of origin.  
 Alongside these statistical assessments, over the last 20 years a 
substantial body of qualitative research has explored different aspects of EU 
migrant workers’ experiences, revealing that many were engaged in 
insecure employment, often on zero hours, agency contracts and were 
vulnerable to exploitation (e.g. Anderson & Rogaly, 2007). This has often 
been highlighted as evidence of ‘precarious’ forms of employment. Lewis 
et al. (2015) defined it as ‘hyper-precarity, while Pradella and Cillo stated 
that the UK labour market was increasingly a place of unstable, short term 
and low paid employment which “is negatively affecting immigrant and 
BME (Black and Minority Ethnic) workers employed in low-skilled, 
precarious jobs and vulnerable sectors of the economy.” (2015, p. 51). 
More recently, Vickers et al. suggested CEE migrants could be 
characterised by three ‘dynamics of precarity - ‘surplus’, ‘rooted’, and 
‘hyper-flexible’ (2019, p. 703). 
 
Migrants of Roma heritage in the UK 
 
Studies of migrants of Roma heritage in the UK have indicated that escaping 
racial discrimination in their countries of origin was a key motivation to 
move here (e.g. European Dialogue, 2009, Cook et al., 2011; Grill, 2018). 
Their endemic exclusion from all but the most menial jobs, (e.g. refuse 
collection, street cleaning), and the exploitative and marginalized conditions 
of much employment has been amply documented (e.g. Barany, 1994; 
ERRC, 2007, Brown et al., 2015). This has been regularly described as 
exemplifying ‘precarization’ (e.g. Vincze, 2015).  
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Improved employment prospects have been a primary driver of migration 
to western EU countries, including the UK (e.g. Piemontese et al. 2013; 
Martin et. al., 2017; Martin et al., 2018), and is an essential aspect of the 
‘search for a better life.’ However, studies suggest employment precarity is 
often the norm in countries of destination (e.g. FRA, 2009; Vlase & 
Preoteasa, 2012; Cherkezova & Tomova, 2013; Apostolova et al., 2014). 
Evidence given to Poole and Adamson (2008) suggested that the 
overwhelming majority of Roma migrants in Govanhill, Glasgow, were 
working in jobs characterised by low pay (often below the minimum wage) 
long hour and hard physical tasks. A contemporary study noted the same 
pattern of “menial, low skilled jobs with short-term contracts” (European 
Dialogue 2009, p. 58), with nearly all finding work via private employment 
agencies.  
Subsequent studies suggested little had changed a decade later (Brown et 
al., 2016, 2018; Migration Yorkshire, 2018). Tileaga et al. stated “Roma 
people are usually employed in temporary jobs and with poor working 
conditions” (2019a, p. 2), adding that women faced even greater 
vulnerabilities. Similarly, Dagilyte and Greenfields reported how 
employment support workers confirmed Roma clients “appeared willing to 
undertake any form of low paid employment and also the precariousness and 
harsh working conditions”, with intensive, often dirty factory work common 
(2015, p. 5).  
The impacts of such irregular and vulnerable employment in terms of 
accessing work related benefit entitlements and even on continued 
residency have also been emphasised. Greenfields and Dagilyte (2018) 
examined how Roma struggled to navigate the system for claiming 
unemployment benefits, and faced disproportionate risks of being asked to 
complete Habitual Residence Tests (HRT) or Right to Reside tests (RTRT), 
with the attendant threat of deportation from the UK to their country of 
origin. 
 
EU Migrants Pre- and post-Referendum 
 
Implementing further restrictions on the entitlements of EU migrants 
resident in the UK was central to the British government’s demands leading 
up to the Referendum. By the time of the vote, migration had become the 
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central issue. On 23rd June 2016, 52% of voters opted to leave the EU, with 
‘Remain’ achieving 48%.  
Following the Referendum, one of the aspects which remained uncertain 
for a long period was the rights and status of citizens of other EU countries 
living in the UK. “The biggest difference which the UK’s departure from the 
EU will cause in this field is disruption to EU citizens’ and UK nationals’ 
migration and mobility rights on the territory of the other.” (Grutters et al., 
2018, p. 10) 
After protracted negotiations, the UK formally left the EU in January 
2020. A Withdrawal Agreement between the two parties approved a one-
year period, during which transitional arrangements would apply, and both 
parties would negotiate the rules on their future relationship. Describing the 
transition period as “business as usual” for its citizens, in early 2020 the 
European Commission stated that the twelve months would be used to 
finalise the details their future relationships. In a ‘Questions and Answers’ 
document, the EC commented that “Protecting the life choices of those 
citizens and their family members has been the first priority from the 
beginning of the negotiation”. (EC, 2020, p. 4). This spelled out in detail the 
clauses protecting EU migrants in the UK. In a section entitled ‘What has 
been agreed on citizens' rights?’, the EC reiterated that after the transition 
period ended, individuals and their family members would continue to 
exercise their rights as EU citizens, “for the rest of their lives, where those 
rights are based on life choices made before the end of the transition period.” 
(EC, 2020, p. 4). The existing ‘substantive conditions of residence’ that had 
pertained would still apply – that is, those who work or have sufficient 
financial resources and sickness insurance could remain and benefit from 
Union law on workers’ rights, but access to social security would be 
dependent on the conclusion of other agreements.  It expected the UK to 
introduce a form of registration for EU citizens in order to give them some 
recognised immigration status but warned this needed to be as simple as 
possible for applicants to navigate, adding that the UK’s treatment of EU 
migrants would be monitored and if necessary investigated, with the 
possibility of legal interventions should contraventions occur. 
However, none of these protections would apply to those arriving “after” 
the end of transition, who would need to prove earnings over £20k per 
annum and qualifications and skills in certain areas of the labour market. 
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Finally, even if the registration process was simple, it still had to be 
completed in order to be officially provided with the relevant documentation 
confirming an individual’s position.  
Following the Referendum result, the UK government began to institute 
measures to replace freedom of movement with bureaucratic immigration 
processes to assess EU migrants’ validity to remain. In 2019, the EU 
Settlement Scheme (EUSS) was introduced. Any EU citizen that moved to 
the UK up to the end of the transition date, [December 30th, 2020], would 
have until 30th June 2021 to apply. As it stands, the Home Office offers two 
options under the EUSS – ‘pre-settled status’ and ‘settled status’. This 
requires applicants to provide evidence of a) proof of identity & nationality 
[usually by passport or national identity card] and b) proof of continuous 
residence. The latest guidance on proof of residence [Published 22 October 
2020] asks the applicant to first submit their “National Insurance number to 
allow an automated check of your residence based on tax and certain benefit 
records”. (Home Office, 2020)1. Those who cannot provide this are asked for 
between one and ten documents, but ideally those showing “a longer period 
of time between 2 dates”. The guidance highlights twelve examples of 
acceptable documents, of which six relate to employment, such as an 
“annual bank statement or account summary, showing at least 6 months of 
payments received or spending in the UK” or an “employer letter confirming 
employment and evidence that the employer is genuine, for example, their 
Companies House number”. Employment histories are therefore a central 
part of the administrative requirements in securing status.    
Various reports and articles have attempted to describe the options that 
EU migrants may be presented with post Brexit, (e.g. James & Mohay, 
2019), and a number have highlighted those groups “most” at risk of not 
securing their long-term residence. Alberti and Barbulescu predicted that “it 
will be harder for precarious migrants with less linear pathways to obtain 
settled or pre-settled status.” (2018, p. 1). Studies have highlighted Roma as 
belonging to that group (Guma and Jones, 2019), with Morris (2016) arguing 
that Roma should be regarded “as a priority vulnerable group” (p.7), because 
existing fragilities such as poverty, insecure employment, tightening 
restrictions on welfare access and rising levels of hate crime were likely to 
be aggravated by new immigration criteria.  Brown et al. (2018) stated that 
Roma were likely to face serious challenges providing the necessary 
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evidence of continued residence, whether that be work related (HMRC tax, 
national insurance records) or alternative forms of proof such as bank 
statements, tenancy agreements, etc. Analysis by the UK based Roma 
Support Group confirmed this, with most clients unable to complete 
applications without support and a significant percentage lacking the 
necessary evidence, or the digital skills (RSG, 2020a, 2020b). Women, older 





Data is drawn from 15 qualitative interviews with EU migrants of Roma 
heritage, resident in two urban settings in northern England. Interviews were 
undertaken in 2019. This sample size was intended to act as a pilot for larger 
study, which inevitably means the data is “illustrative rather than 
representative” (Pemberton & Scullion, 2013, p. 449).  
Inclusion was partly determined by the UK government’s eligibility 
criteria for EU migrants applying for ‘pre settled’ or ‘settled’ status. 
Prospective interviewees should not have taken British citizenship but could 
have applied for pre- or settled status, and ideally should have completed, or 
be near to completing, five years of residence.  
Fieldwork was undertaken by two workers of Eastern European Roma 
heritage who had moved to the UK from CEE following A8/A2 accession.  
Using researchers of Roma heritage helped to ‘minimise the gap’, between 
participants and academic research in several ways. Firstly, both were multi-
lingual in Romani, Hungarian, and Romanian and English. At the 
recruitment stage, they were able to verbally explain the study, relevant 
information and consent processes to potential participants in their preferred 
language, which was important to address any literacy issues. These 
materials were also translated into Hungarian and Romanian. The 
fieldworkers conducted the interviews in the preferred language [including 
Romani] and transcribed the audio into English. One fieldworker was male 
and one female, with a view to reducing any extra gender-based barriers to 
participation. 
Respondents were originally from Slovakia, Romania or Hungary with an 
age range between 27 and 58. Ten were male, and five female. Length of 
IJRS – International Journal of Roma Studies, 3(1) 53 
 
 
residence ranged from 6 months to 11 years, with most between 4-6 years. A 
semi-structured questionnaire was employed. The topics loosely followed 
the UK Home Office settlement requirements, with questions focusing on: 
  
• Working history over past five years, including recruitment 
pathways– (e.g. agency, family, etc.), periods of unemployment or 
informal employment, etc.). 
• What documentation they have received or possess (if any), 
regarding work and related fields.  
• Knowledge of Brexit and its implications. 
• Experience of applying for settled status or expectation of doing so. 
• Future plans. 
 
The study was granted ethical approval via the University of Salford’s 
internal ethics panel. Participants are identified using the following code 
(participant number, gender, age, country of origin, date of arrival in the 
UK), when first cited. 
Findings 
 
As providing officially recognised proofs of consistent employment is a core 
part of the process of securing settled status post Brexit, examining working 
histories is important for understanding how Brexit has extended ‘the reach’ 
of precarious labour, and how it has ‘bled’ far further into the life journey 
and existential hopes for the future than previous studies conducted pre-
Brexit have emphasised. Brexit provides a specific opportunity to analyse 
this question, because it brings to a crisis a whole series of pending 




The evidence from respondents demonstrates the multiple features of 
precarious labour, which many Roma living in the UK remain, engaged in, 
even long after first arriving. For most of the sample, precarious 
employment was the norm, never having had consistent, formalised 
employment in the UK. Of the fifteen interviewed, ten were ‘active’ in the 
labour market and five unemployed at the time of interview. However, the 
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boundaries of employment status were complicated by the fact that many 
were on temporary, zero hours contracts and only worked when an agency 
called to offer opportunities, or when they managed to find intermittent 
pieces of work themselves1. It is notable that of the five women interviewed, 
three had never worked in in the UK, despite each having least four years 
residency; a fourth had had periods of ill health which had prevented her 
from working at various times in her four years in the country, while the 
fifth had only been in the UK six months. 
Those who were self-employed had no guarantee of regular work, either. 
While self-employment could include running one’s own business, it could 
also apply to an individual working for a company, but technically classed as  
a form of sub-contractor [a status which has created considerable 
uncertainty, even for legal specialists – see CIPD, 2020]. As one described 
it, “I was never employed; it was always self-employed and not really, I 
didn't get a contract.” (Participant 7, M, 39, RO, 2013).  
The type of employment was overwhelmingly low status. Of the ten 
deemed ‘active’, five were cleaners (Participants 2, 10, 11, 12, 14). Two 
were in some kind of factory work (3, 9), one was involved in gardening 
(15) and one did not specify the work they were involved in (7). The 
exceptions to this were a qualified mechanic (1) and a qualified engineer (6). 
The former had worked for some time in a car garage but had also done car 
washing and construction and was currently unemployed. The latter 
continued to work in the engineering industry, but all his jobs over the last 
five years had come via agencies and recruiters, and had involved temporary 
contracts, resulting in periods of unemployment between opportunities 
(Participant 6, M, 32, RO, 2010).  
Multiple concurrent jobs continued to be the norm. One man who had 
worked “constantly” in his family cleaning business had previously 
combined this with warehouse work obtained via an agency (Participant 10, 
M, 54, HG, 2012). A woman related how she was a self-employed cleaner 
while also packing products. (Participant 14, F, 58, HG, 2015). 
Agencies were the main way respondents sourced work. Eight had 
previously been, or were currently employed, via an agency. One man stated 
that if he was unable to get work through one agency, he would “just go and 
ask for different ones, so I kept on doing that, even in (the) present.” 
(Participant 3, M, 35, SK, 2015). In the four years since arriving in the UK 
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from Slovakia, he had worked in the food industry, as a painter, at a car 
wash, in construction, and picking and packing in a factory. Agency work 
remained unstable for many. “I had all sorts of jobs through the agency in 
construction or labour, […] I've got a working contract with the agency. I do 
not get any holidays paid as it's a type of a zero hours contract.” (Participant 
1, M, 36, SK, 2015) 
Periods of unemployment were frequent. For some, the balance was 
skewed towards unemployment, with Participant 11 (M, HG, 42, 2013) 
having had no work for 50 to 60% of the time. In of itself, this uncertainty 
was demonstrative of precarity. To compound this, for a number of 
interviewees work had been interrupted by periods of ill health. 
The picture of employment, although tentative, raises a number of key 
points. Firstly, that informality and precarity were evident from the start. 
Secondly, accepting multiple short term, low status jobs, (either concurrently 
or consecutively), was common. In many accounts the irregular, exploitative 
nature of the work, (at least at the start), was clear. One participant 
commented: “this was all temporary jobs without really a contract, being 
paid between £10 to £30 a day from morning until evening.” He had since 
found work via an agency, which paid the National Minimum Wage - albeit 
on a zero hours contract. “Therefore, if there's no work required then they'll 
just ask me to stay at home.” (Participant 2 M, 31, SK, 2014). 
 The challenges in securing and maintaining work, the ever present risk 
of Habitual Residency Tests or Genuine Prospect of Work tests (12/15 had 
been asked to undergo one or other, with four confirming they failed), the 
informal nature of much employment and the risk of exploitation - and the 
fact that there had been little improvement, for those with longer residencies- 
confirms that migrants of Roma heritage face considerable risks in securing 
their long term status in the UK. For many families, the ability to carry on 
finding work, and earning a living is in jeopardy. Such jeopardy is even 
greater for those with interrupted, or no working histories - and women, 











Among respondents, the Referendum result had come as an unpleasant 
surprise. Most recalled their initial responses as ones of shock and fear. The 
word ‘scared’ was used by multiple respondents. This fear was linked to 
uncertainty about what exactly it meant. As one put it: “We all got very 
desperate as we had no clue what may happen to us after Brexit and what 
decisions they may make.” (Participant 12, M, 27, HG, 2012) 
 Fear/uncertainty was expressed in the shock at the result, whether 
eviction/deportation would occur, or if evidence was sufficient to remain, 
and whether and how family members would be affected. “For us, we are 
more than ten years in England, and our children go to school here, but we 
are still scared that we might need to return abroad, even though we don't 
want to.” (Participant 8, F, 47, SK, 2015) 
 Such recollections were invariably framed within the context of the 
family – ‘we’ or ‘us.’ Deportation was a common fear, which had not 
diminished since the Vote to Leave: “I keep on asking people, are they going 
to just evict us? Are they going to send us home?” (Participant 1) 
The repeated reference to ‘eviction’ or forced departure in participants’ 
testimonies echoed the reaction by those interviewed shortly after the 
Referendum result (Migration Yorkshire, 2017). While fears of transiency 
appeared in all testimonies, they were especially pessimistic for women (or 
in references to them) and were often linked to employment. Not knowing 
what to do for the best was constant refrain throughout all the interviews.  
Precarity of information about what to do next was another manifestation. 
Most had not applied for ‘pre-settled’ or ‘settled’ status, remaining unsure 
about the evidence needed, the exact timescales or who to ask and all 
suggested that other members of their family would need to acquire it. 
Participant 1 suggested that he was waiting until September 2019 to see 
whether someone at the local community centre, other professionals “or 
maybe some Roma” could help. He “thought he had heard” a passport was 
needed, but he only had an ID card; being unsure of his status, he needed 
“some help from somebody” to complete the forms. This tallies with the 
experience of Roma Support Group (2020a), many of whose clients were 
reliant on formal or informal support to navigate the EUSS system. 
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Participants 3 and 5 (F, 29, SK, 2015) indicated their social worker would 
assist them and their family members to apply, while Participant 4 (F, 36, 
SK, 2014) was hopeful a local advice bureau would help. Participant 7 stated 
“our family” normally paid other Roma from Romania or local ‘Asian 
people’ for advice, which was a fall-back strategy for Participant 8, should 
other members of the Slovak Roma community, or her family, be unable to 
help. The latter had not applied yet and was “waiting to see who is going to 
help us to apply, maybe next year we will apply.”  
While most were aware there was some type of application process, 
knowledge of the exact procedures was often imprecise. Participant 13, (M, 
27, HG  11 years) had heard of the settlement scheme, but was unsure of 
what to do to apply, while Participant 12 had no knowledge of where to seek 
advice or guidance on the issue. Nevertheless, others were aware that 
employment was the key to securing status here. Participant 7 commented: 
“We still work and we plan to apply for residency next year. Maybe if we 
get refused, we will have to go back to Romania.” 
Even for those in professional jobs and possessing a reasonable 
understanding of what they were required to do now faced a more precarious 
future.  
 
Yes, I know what we need to do. I need to apply for the residency test, but 
even though I have more than five years in this country, I cannot prove them 
all legally, due to my employment status. I always worked as a self-employed 
person and not every year I made a profit. Therefore, I'm hoping that maybe 
next year I will have five years with income that I can prove, and I can apply 
for the settled status. (Participant 6) 
 
The reference relates to the need to provide a minimum of 5 years 
residence in the UK, usually through records of employment. This individual 
had ended up leaving for another EU country, where employment was more 
secure but had left the remainder of his family in the UK. His parents were 
dependent on him, and his departure placed them in a very precarious 
situation. As soon as he attained the 5-year threshold, Participant 2 would 
“make sure because we have this deadline until next year to apply.” (i.e. 
2020) For those who had not worked at all, their situation, and that of their 
family, was far more precarious. Participant 8 had been in the UK for four 
years, joining family present for more than a decade. Both she and her 
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husband (who had formerly worked full-time) were full time carers, 
“therefore we cannot find a job”. She added, “We are scared because Brexit 
means will send us home, if you don't work, and we don't work, because we 
have to look after our children with disabilities and needs.” 
She added that of the more than 100 family members in the UK “at least 
half of us cannot prove our status in this country, even though we are here 
more than ten years.” Like her, Participant 5 was also a full-time career for a 
disabled child. This question of family status also affected Participant 7, who 
while active in the labour market himself, was more scared about his wife 
“she didn't really work a lot… and my daughter, who goes to school in 
England and settled down here.” Despite passing an earlier residency test 
and having worked nearly five years in the UK, he remained uncertain he 
would reach a threshold for settlement because he had not made a profit 
every year. These anxieties were linked to work, but also time.  
However, while Brexit may have created new forms of precarity, this was 
not being passively accepted.  As Participant 3 stated: 
 
We don't want to go home. That's why we came here. We fight for a better 
life and this is our children's future in place here, so this is not a game…. 
therefore I will fight to prove to the Home Office and provide the documents 
required and hopefully we will continue to exercise the same rights. 
(Participant 3) 
 
Expressions of such sentiments contained both fears of ‘forced mobility’ 
but also coping, waiting a refusal of one future and resolve to choose 
another.  
 
I definitely want to stay in England, and I will make sure we will complete 
the relevant forms. For my family, we will prove, and we will submit all the 
required documents and hopefully they will be satisfied with what we will 
send, but the fear won't go away. We still have the fear that something might 
happen, and they will oblige us to go back to our home country. As long as 
we stay here I will try to do my best to prove that we are legally living in the 
UK and that our children are going to school, and their future is in this 
country. (Participant 1) 
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While many quotes exemplify how the precarity of labour is linked to the 
precarity of status and a wider precarity of imagined futures, they also hinted 
at less pessimistic feelings of hope, ambition and even agency. Despite 
having never worked in the UK, Participant 4 was defiant: “I won't go home 
just because some people will tell me that I am Roma and I need to go home. 





Within Roma studies, a significant body of theoretical work has analysed 
how specific, racialized forms of neo-liberalism have created and governed 
precarity in the lives of Roma communities in the EU, both in their countries 
of origin, and as migrants (e.g. Van Baar, 2017; Kozce, 2018). This has 
included the ‘biopolitical bordering’ of Roma, in which neo-liberal 
structures establish citizenship inclusion criteria which are far harder to 
attain by those already disadvantaged by racial exclusion, thus effecting 
further marginalisation. In this framework, the architecture of migration 
remains racially loaded. For example, writing about Roma migrants, Nagy 
has argued the Referendum and the subsequent Leave vote “created new 
insecurities for EU citizens living in the UK.” (2018, p. 127), one in which 
“neoliberal state recognition has become based on legal economic activity 
and social citizenship” (2018, p. 131). The centrality of regularised 
employment to securing post Brexit status offers a specific opportunity to 
study how the neo-liberal racialized governance of migration functions in 
practice for those who are among the most exposed to its operation. Brexit 
may therefore be seen as an “intensified management of migration and 
borders”, an extension of surveillance, which borrows some of the 
regulations of freedom of movement even as it seeks to close it down. (Van 
Baar, 2016, p. 217).   
However, I suggest that the racial governance which Brexit poses for 
migrants of Roma heritage produces forms of precarity that are both 
quantitively and qualitatively different than others. It is quantitively 
different, because it has created inclusion criteria that are far harder to attain 
for migrants of Roma heritage than many other EU migrants.  
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However, I also suggest the precarity engendered by Brexit is 
qualitatively, (or existentially), different, in that the precarity represents a 
threat to identities, meanings, purposes and futures that are different as well, 
because they are seen as possible only in the UK, in contrast to other places, 
and take forms specific to the experiences and aspirations of Roma. It is 
worth considering the character of these forms of precarity.  
Theorising the ‘biopolitics of the self’ under migration, McCormack & 
Salmenniemi (2016), ask, “How does precarity or a sense of vulnerability 
affect meanings of labour, the self and risk, and how does precarity shape 
modalities of agency?” (p. 3). The testimony collected for this study allows 
us to examine how this precarity acts existentially – how it affects meaning 
and interpretations of self, place and time and how it can expand and 
contract their possibilities, both in positive and negative ways. Allison & 
Piot draw attention to the precariousness and risks of ‘dream-making’ and 
‘imaginings’: “what happens to sensibilities of time—whether or not their 
horizons of expectation are oriented to the present or future…” (2012, p. 4) 
Interviewees confirmed the finding of earlier studies (Brown et al. 2016; 
Grill, 2018), that the UK (unlike countries of origin), represented a space of 
existential possibility even while it creates precarity. The imagined 
destination of a ‘better life’ remains a common refrain among respondents in 
studies of Roma migrants in the UK. Work was a practical function of this: 
employment, even if low status – still provided a greater facility for such 
possibilities to be realised. But it is exactly the existential threat that Brexit 
poses to this that creates such fear and uncertainty, because it introduced a 
new time limited bureaucratic imperative, (albeit one that has been 
somewhat open ended), an imperative  that imperils the security of family, 
identity and futures. The extended period of time between the vote and final 
departure – a ‘no man’s land’ - has placed whole lives in a ‘holding pattern.’ 
The negative temporality of this Brexit precarity is evident in the sense of 
limited time remaining to apply or for the extension period to run out - 
“we've only got one year left” - or the need to prove certain years’ worth of 
work. For migrants of Roma heritage, ‘Brexit precarity’ has its own 
temporality. 
Fears of being forced to leave the UK were expressed throughout. Van 
Baar has written about the specific ‘logics’ of evictability/deportation which 
have often been applied to EU citizens of Roma heritage within the borders 
IJRS – International Journal of Roma Studies, 3(1) 61 
 
 
of the Union. This, he argues is a part of a discourse which is “considerably 
anchored in processes of neo-liberalization” (Van Baar, 2016, p.15) and 
“governed on the basis of their alleged contribution to the productivity, 
health, wealth, and security of the EU’s population.” (p. 6). There were 
striking examples of this throughout the interviews. Leaving was not a 
matter of choice, but a form of eviction or ‘unfree mobility’ (Yildiz & de 
Genova, 2017). In this way, it can be ranked as another racialized crisis of 
EU migration, alongside the Italian ‘nomad emergency’ and the French 
deportation crisis, which began under the Sarkozy government (e.g. Parker, 
2012).  
Brexit had also extended precarity of information by requiring a whole 
new arena of knowledge to be absorbed by those who wish to remain in the 
UK. Participants were often unsure about what they needed to secure their 
residency status and indicated they would have to rely on others for 
assistance to complete. This, as well as the digital and literacy barriers, (the 
application process is online), creating a significant preliminary barrier even 
before the bureaucratic challenges associated with providing evidence of 
work histories.  
Yet at the same time, many refused to accept the inevitability of this 
outcome. Pulay (2018) has cautioned that ‘resistance’ is a loaded term to 
describe the willingness to challenge externally imposed solutions, implying 
that Roma do not want inclusion in the same social structures as others, and 
says more about academics’ own attitudes to neo-liberalism than about 
Roma’s own views. Writing about migrants of Roma heritage in the UK, 
Nagy observed “coping strategies in line with constantly changing screening 
and exclusionary practice.” (2018, p. 131).  ‘Coping’ also implies a negative 
response to the situation. While many may indeed be managing as best they 
can, the term “agency” may be more useful in exploring the practical 
contingencies Roma have developed in response to Brexit. Examples 
revealing the ‘modalities of agency’, which Allison and Piot describe, were 
evident in many testimonies: “I am trying to solidify our future here so we 
can stay here continuously. I am trying to get hold of all necessary 
documents and also trying to work more.” (Participant 11) 
Such temporal urgency to secure the correct information and sufficient 
evidence could be a source of resolve.  
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In this way, Brexit “creates” new forms of agency, characterised by 
affective responses that display urgency, determination and purpose. Part of 
what drives those responses  is the sense of time reversing - ‘going back’-  to 
places which limited hope and magnified fear yet stretched time without 
purpose; in essence places of almost total precarity and the very reason for 
migration to the UK in the first place. 
Often fear/uncertainty and hope/agency were co-existent. This was 
particularly the case when it came to the future prospects facing family 
members. In every testimony, the family was core to articulating a space of 
agency to what seemed, at times, the inevitability of departure. The 
importance of family connections among migrants in the UK has been noted, 
(e.g. Ryan et al. 2009), but its particular relevance for Roma should not be 
underestimated.  
Family members were the source of employment opportunities in the 
beginning, but also the first port of call for advice and support to enable 
them to remain. They were also a temporal source of hope in the form of 
imagined futures - the educational achievements of children and young 
people were of equal, if not greater value to their own career prospects. 
Previous consultations with Roma migrants (e.g. Brown et al., 2016; 
Migration Yorkshire, 2017) have also highlighted how, this identity was 
rooted in places with family relevance, represented by both the past (e.g. 
burial of relatives here) and the future (children’s/grandchildren’s 
education). Such examples of agency align with the perspective that:  
 
“accounts and experiences of Roma migration also reveal an emerging self-
emancipation repertoire mobilised around the idea of self-expression, more 
control over one’s own destiny and means of self-affirmation and self-
definition.” (Tileaga et al., 2019a, p.3) 
 
Interviewees’ testimonies demonstrates their continued determination to 
fashion a better future here in the UK. Brexit continues to render that fragile, 
but it is determined. Overall, we can agree with Boterill et al (2019) that post 
Brexit an “expanded concept of belonging” will be valuable, one which is 
not restricted to legal and bureaucratic definitions but encompasses 
“informal, emotional, and affective bonds and encounters in everyday life.” 
(p. 3). 
 





The period from the Referendum to the present has represented a notable 
political and social watershed for the UK, one that has introduced a dilemma 
for many working migrants from the EU living in the country. Even after the 
UK’s transition period came to an end on 31st December 2020, the 
implications of Brexit for their longer-term futures in the UK continue to be 
unclear. The final shape of the landscape is still unknown, but Brexit will 
bring considerable changes in the status of all EU citizens.  
 Proposed changes – whether high-income thresholds, tight permanent 
residency rules etc., - are very likely to leave already vulnerable workers 
even more exposed. The potential of EU labour regulations being dispensed 
with is also a possibility. In that regard, this paper is very timely.  
Focusing on EU migrants of Roma heritage allows us to see that this 
vulnerability is not evenly distributed. Although a small sample, the 
evidence of precarious labour which many were engaged in, plus the lack of 
work for others, (particularly women), means the fears of many researchers 
that Brexit will exacerbate the specific precarity of Roma migrants are being 
realised. Successfully securing longer-term status through the EUSS is 
heavily dependent on formalised evidence of regular work patterns, but also 
in having the necessary information and skills to navigate the online 
processes. In that sense, the earlier experiences of undergoing Habitual 
Residency Tests or Genuine Prospects of Work (GPoWT) tests were ‘dry 
runs’ for many Roma, prefiguring the EUSS scheme, in the challenges they 
faced proving consistent employment histories and in understanding a 
complex institutional process. Analysis of EUSS applications suggest Roma 
are far more likely than other groups to be granted the more limited ‘pre 
settled’ rather than ‘settled’ status; holders of ‘pre settled’ status must apply 
for indefinite leave to remain (ILR) after five years. (RSG, 2020c).  
The social impacts of Brexit for migrants of Roma heritage in the UK are 
likely to be profound. Early studies indicate that even after acquiring 
‘settled’ or ‘pre-settled’ status, individuals are now being asked to provide 
proof of residency when applying for healthcare, education and benefits 
applications, partly the result of a lack of understanding on the part of 
frontline workers (RSG, 2020c). This poses a heightened risk of losing 
entitlements to services as well as exploitation by those claiming to be able 
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to resolve such problems. This may well create extra demand on services if 
Roma are pushed further into crisis. 
This paper has sought to demonstrate how Brexit has deepened and 
reshaped existing precarities while creating new forms beyond practical 
considerations of work. In doing so, it has placed whole lives in a precarious 
position. It has compressed precarity of time, extended precarity of 
information and reawakened precarities of belonging (as expressed in the 
fear of eviction). At the same time, by forcing individuals to address 
precarity of identity and place it has, paradoxically, reduced their existential 
fragility. Determination and agency are re-inforced, and imagined futures, 
particularly family prospects come into ever sharper focus. Analysing the 
responses of the people interviewed for this study to Brexit suggest that 
alongside the fear and pessimism is a powerful sense of agency, to do what it 
takes to remain in the UK.  These responses also show the continuation of 
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